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The Possibilities of an Independent Special Rapporteur
i  Scheme 
Abstract: The independence and impartiality of the special rapporteurs is undoubtedly  
one of considerable importance to their work. In the context of the special procedures  
operating under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, a number of questions arise:  
what is meant by independent; independent of what; why is independence deemed so 
important; and what are the major barriers to independence? This article focuses on  
those questions, with particular regard to the role of the Human Rights Council (whose  
operation is scheduled for review in 2011) then draws together the threads of argument  
to ponder the implications, particularly for the Human Rights Council, of removing  
rapporteurs from its jurisdiction. (108 words)
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Special Rapporteurs are one of the ‘least studied aspects of the United Nations system of 
protecting human rights’.ii Within a relatively compact body of literature, there is little specific 
consideration given to the independence of the rapporteurs, although the topic has been accorded 
greater importance in the context of the imminent review of the Human Rights Council and its 
special procedures. This article will examine some aspects of that divisive topic by delineating 
the parameters for independence then considering the relationship between the Human Rights 
Council and its rapporteurs. Thereafter, alternative frameworks will be outlined with note of the 
implications for the Human Rights Council. It appears that the Human Rights Council may suffer 
a credibility deficit should it ‘lose’ the rapporteurs and thus it is to be hoped that efforts will be 
made to support and enhance their work during the imminent review. This should in turn 
strengthen the role of the Human Rights Council and perhaps even consolidate its position within 
the United Nations.
What is meant by ‘independent’?
‘Independence’ is a much discussed attribute within international human rights.iii Inevitably any 
discussion on independence requires agreement on the definition deployed – for the purpose of 
this article, international human rights texts are used as a benchmarkiv with the additional UN 
requirements of gender balance and geographical spread. Taking a simple doctrinal analysis, it is 
clear that the special rapporteurs generally satisfy objective tests of independence. Independence 
is the third stated criteria for appointment,v followed by impartialityvi and objectivity.vii Article 3 
of the Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-holders enshrines the general principles 
of conduct and states that ‘mandate-holders are independent United Nations experts’ who shall 
‘act in an independent capacity, and exercise their functions in accordance with their 
mandate, through a professional, impartial assessment of facts based on internationally 
recognized human rights standards, and free from any kind of extraneous influence, 
incitement, pressure, threat or interference, either direct or indirect, on the part of any 
party, whether stakeholder or not, for any reason whatsoever, the notion of independence 
being linked to the status of mandate-holders, and to their freedom to assess the human 
rights questions that they are called upon to examine under their mandate’.viii 
This provision is corroborated with subsequent statements on the need for mandate-holders to be 
mindful of ‘the fundamental obligations of truthfulness, loyalty and independence pertaining to 
their mandate’ix and exhortations to ‘uphold the highest standards of efficiency, competence and 
integrity, meaning, in particular, though not exclusively, probity, impartiality, equity, honesty 
and good faith’.x Subsequent sub-paragraphs provide a clear definition of independence, 
prohibiting financial or other private gain, and acceptance of honours, gifts etc for activities in 
pursuance of their functions. The Manual of Operations of the Special Procedures of the Human 
Rights Council reiterates this, noting that this requirement does not preclude dialogue with a 
wide range of actors.xi
As Lempinen notes, ‘[i]t is an undisputed fact that the strength of the system of special 
procedures lies in its ability of carrying out investigations impartially and independently’.xii 
Independence garners respect, promotes confidence at the absence of bias and should facilitate 
access to all material and sources (eg a government agency may not be accorded full access to 
civil society material). It thus engenders respect from all sides. If the rapporteur is independent, 
s/he should have more freedom to access a variety of sources and understand their relative value 
in an attempt at achieving a balanced viewpoint of the actual situation, of the best means of 
developing the right and such like. If States view the rapporteur as independent, they are more 
likely to enter into constructive dialogue with greater potential for positive results. If the Human 
Rights Council accepts their independence, greater weight should be placed on the reports 
produced. If people (in States) consider the mechanism independent, assurance of confidentiality 
will be maintained and trusted and thus more comprehensive and accurate information will 
become available to the rapporteur.
Clearly, it is not necessarily enough to be independent, that independence must be irrefutable.xiii 
Objective and subjectively verified independence should maintain confidence in the system of 
special rapporteurs. Although appearing apolitical implies neutrality and the absence of bias, in 
extremis it could suggest a consequential lack of passion and interest. Perhaps independence, 
while important, should not be the definitive criteria.
Relationships between the special rapporteurs and key actors
Independence is viewed as a sine qua non of special rapporteurs, yet remains difficult to define. 
On the practical level, a more relevant approach is to consider the relationship between special 
rapporteurs and key actors.
Special rapporteurs and States
Technically special rapporteurs are appointed by States (specifically those sitting in the Human 
Rights Council), may be nominated by States and are dependent on States issuing invitations for 
visits. Nevertheless, they are required to be independent of States and governments. On one 
hand, this can be straightforward, as the Code of Conduct and Manual emphasise that mandate 
holders must not be influenced by States or receive honours and such like from governments. On 
the other hand, mandate holders are not stateless and thus all have a relationship with a State, and 
indeed are required to conform to travel authorisation/visa requirements in their country of 
nationality despite benefitting from immunity of UN staff members.xiv 
More problematically, given some rapporteurs have previous links to their governments, the 
Coordination Committee for Special Procedures suggested that ‘[t]he requisite of independence 
and impartiality is not compatible with the appointment of individuals currently holding 
decision-making positions within the executive or legislative branches of their Governments’.xv 
The eventual wording adopted by the Human Rights Council is broader: ‘individuals holding 
decision-making positions in Government or in any other organization or entity’,xvi phraseology 
which has potentially adverse implications for human rights activists and defenders with various 
organizations.xvii Emphasising current ‘decision-making’ employment within Government is 
sensible but in theory would thus permit appointments of diplomats, retired heads of government 
or State and current government employees (who meet the other criteria). While such people 
may well satisfy objective tests of independence, would they be ‘seen to be independent’ on a 
subjective test?
During visits rapporteurs work with a cross-section of entities in a State, including the 
government (usually the primary contact as visits are by official invitation), the National Human 
Rights Institution (if there is one), non-governmental organisations and civil society 
representatives and such other people and bodies as the rapporteur deems important/ appropriate. 
Generally the rapporteurs require freedom to shape their visits and act independently in 
furtherance of their enquiries. Where the government unduly restricts such freedom, rapporteurs 
may decide not to continue with the visit, or if restrictions are announced in advance, a planned 
visit may be cancelled.xviii
A mutually respectful relationship between States and Special Rapporteurs is essential for visits 
to be undertaken. Nevertheless, for independence tests to be satisfied, the rapporteurs must be 
accorded considerable autonomy when onsite. Following normal diplomacy practice, some 
rapporteurs will raise issues of concern with the government while on a visit and may intimate 
the principal areas of their report. Part of the mutually respectful relationship is constructive 
dialogue, with rapporteurs seeking to evaluate facts and then assist States in fulfilling their 
obligations under international law. Thus to ensure a balanced representation of views, States 
have the opportunity to respond publicly to criticism (and praise) of rapporteurs.
Special rapporteurs and the UN 
The relationship between the Human Rights Council and special rapporteurs is considered in 
more detail below, but what of the UN generally? Special rapporteurs are not UN employees but 
are entitled to UN immunities. This does not compromise their independence, but rather is 
necessary to ensure they can discharge their mandates unhindered by threat of legal action.xix 
Similarly, when travelling to countries posing a security risk, the UN may provide protection, a 
move which should ensure greater independence than may be the case if that security was 
provided exclusively the State being visited. Complete independence from the UN is impossible 
but autonomy within the organisation is both possible and necessary. Rapporteurs benefit from 
the UN endorsement giving credibility and weight to their work, as well as affording a degree of 
personal protection. The United Nations’ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
also provides administrative support, including travel arrangements and country briefings.xx 
As for other UN mechanisms, practically the work of the rapporteurs is distinct from that of the 
treaty monitoring bodies: the latter, while independent individual experts, are obviously 
restricted in operation to the powers conferred on them by the pertinent treaty,xxi are limited to 
consideration of State reports and related information and are obviously limited to the rights 
contained in the treaty itself.xxii Generally there is a cordial relationship with treaty bodies 
sometimes referring to the work of rapporteurs and rapporteurs perusing relevant treaty body 
reports in preparation for visits. Some individuals have served in both capacities,xxiii fostering a 
greater understanding of the compatability of functions in furtherance of protecting and 
promoting human rights. It is obviously not desirable (from an independence standpoint) for the 
two roles to be exercised simultaneously, as too the Advisory Committee  to the Human Rights 
Council.xxiv The appointment of a UN staff member (full or even part-time) would be a very 
different proposition.
Overall, it appears that the current system facilitates respect for autonomy within the wider 
United Nations and thus meets requirements for independence.
Special Rapporteurs and NGOs/IGOs
Independence from other Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) as former employees is 
another issue. There are circumstances in which former IGO staff are offered mandates and care 
must be taken to ensure no evidence of influence, ie subjective independence tests are met. 
Similarly with NGOs. While the code of conduct controversially suggests that there should be no 
relationship with NGOs or civil society, this is perhaps not strictly necessary. Nifosi considers 
that appointing individuals who were ‘former or current NGO members, lawyers or professors of 
PIL’ and who ‘started to apply their own expertise in discharging the mandates entrusted to 
them’ a breakthrough, with a ‘correlation between the human rights background and legal 
expertise of the experts and a more incisive implementation of their mandates’.xxv Precluding the 
appointments of individuals with such expertise may thus be unhelpful. In any event, many 
employers have links with NGOs as do many academics, external engagement being encouraged 
not least under human rights education principles. Removing all such individuals from the pool 
of potential rapporteurs could be counterproductive: preserving objective independence at the 
expense of proven competency.
The ‘knowledge’ requirement of appointment achieves appropriate prominence in the 
documentation.xxvi However, it is a controversial requirement when considered alongside the 
Code of Conduct. There are undoubted benefits to familiarity with the UN system and certainly 
many rapporteurs have CVs including  UN internships, spells as government employees, work 
with NGOs etc. Insufficient evidence is available online to comment on how many appointees 
have no such experience. Certainly it is fair to say that life in a vacuum would probably not 
foster the ideal skills and experience for being a Special Rapporteur. After all, international 
human rights has an inherent political dimension and subject expertise is demonstrably a factor 
impacting on the increasingly professional discharge of mandates.xxvii
Within the international system, it is the Human Rights Council which has the most overt impact 
on the special rapporteurs, hence this journal edition in advance of the 2011 review. The 
relationship between the Council and its rapporteurs thus requires closer examination to establish 
whether independence is compromised.
Relationship between the Human Rights Council and its Rapporteurs
The Code of Conduct explicitly states that mandate holders are accountable to the Human Rights 
Council in fulfilment of their mandates.xxviii It is thus difficult to maintain a veneer of 
independence therefromxxix with several sources of potential friction. Arguably these are more 
pronounced in respect of country mandates as the Council is effectively stating that a named 
country has significant failings in human rights. The record suggests that procedure is 
politicisedxxxand States all too often respond by refuting the mandate imposed. This often 
manifests itself with denial of access – see, for example, the country mandates for Myanmarxxxi 
and the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea.xxxii Although thematic rapporteurs may have 
requests to visit refused by some States, their work can continue unabated albeit through visits 
elsewhere. 
On tests of independence, the Human Rights Council appoints, approves, considers and 
terminates the mandates/ mandate-holders. All stages of this process must be evaluated through 
the prism of independence, with many States acknowledging that transparency is crucial, 
especially for appointment and termination.xxxiii
Appointment
The President of the Council appoints the mandate-holder, drawing on the public list compiled in 
light of the criteria specified in the Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 which further provides 
that ‘due consideration should be given to gender balance and equitable geographic 
representation, as well as to an appropriate representation of different legal systems.’.xxxiv This 
requirement furthers the subjective test of rapporteurs being ‘seen’ to be independent and 
impartial. Certainly almost any entity can nominate candidates: governments, regional UN 
groups, international organizations (including OHCHR), NGOs, other human rights bodies and 
individualsxxxv with a list of eligible persons maintained by the OHCHR. Upcoming mandates are 
now also advertised. A consultative group (of the Human Rights Council)xxxvi effectively 
shortlists the candidates for upcoming mandates. Nominees from and outwith the list can be 
considered, and views of outgoing special rapporteurs sought.xxxvii The final recommendations 
can be the subject of further consultations at the behest of the Human Rights Council President 
before appointments are made following approval of the Council.xxxviii This multi-stage 
appointment process is undoubtedly symptomatic of attempts to render the process more 
transparent (previously appointments under the Commission were much more ad hoc, at least 
when viewed objectively). 
A cursory evaluation of the present (as of 1 August 2010) mandates reveals the following data:
Country mandates. There are currently eight country mandates, three in Africa,xxxix one in Latin 
Americaxl and four in Asia.xli The mandate holders are three Asian,xlii two African,xliii two 
Western and Europeanxliv and one Latin American.xlv Although mandate holders represent a 
geographical spread and different legal systems, it is debatable whether the spread is equitable. 
As for gender, all the country rapporteurs are currently male!
Thematic mandates. There are currently 27 individual mandate holders and four working 
groups. Within each working group there is a geographical spread (one representative from each 
regional grouping) and an approximate gender balance.xlvi Within the individual mandates, five 
are Latin American,xlvii seven are African,xlviii five are Asian,xlix two are East Europeanl and nine 
are Western and European.li Again the equitable nature of the spread may be questioned with 
three individual mandate holders from the USA, two each from South Africa, India and Brazil. 
(Interesting although some sixty-eight countries have issued standing invitations for Special 
Procedures, the USA is not among them.) With the presence of South African rapporteurs, 
hybrid legal systems are now represented. As for gender, eleven are female and sixteen male.lii 
There are clearly some unresolved issues over gender and geographical balance of mandate 
holders, though there are arguably questions over whether a geographical and gender balance is 
essential. However, with gender mainstreaming in the UN and the pre-eminence of equality of 
nations large and small, east and west, north and south, these two requirements must be retained 
and monitored. 
A further ‘covert’ requirement is availability. Mandate holders must be able to undertake the 
work necessary, work which is carried out on, in effect, a pro bono basis. Around 45 days per 
annum are required, though the reality is often more. In itself this acts as a filtering process as 
not everyone with due experience and the requisite skills has the flexibility and time to undertake 
missions. Some systems of employment law would allow unpaid (or indeed paid) leave of 
absence for employees appointed to a mandate, but the time factor may explain in part the 
number of academics serving as rapporteurs. Obviously they have the relevant expertise but 
crucially they have work which is traditionally more flexible than other employment. However, 
many universities are technically public not private enterprises thus the independence 
requirement is predicated on full respect for academic freedom.
Special rapporteurs are appointed ultimately by the Human Rights Council which, by definition, 
is a political body comprising States. This arguably compromises independence. Suggestions that 
the UN OHCHR could instead propose appointees have not been taken up, neither have other 
suggestions on other models of appointment.liii Nevertheless in many national systems, the 
appointment of judges are subject to governmental approval,liv thus arguably the appointment 
system as it stands is not irrevocably flawed. There are some issues concerning politicisation of 
the process, eg condemnation by Israel of the appointment of Richard Falk to his mandate on the 
Palestinian Territories, though obviously in that case, the appointment was still made, but overall 
the rhetoric of independence appears respected.
Termination of mandate
Security of tenure is an objective indicator of independence. Emerging evidence suggests the 
Council is beginning to consider renewal of special rapporteur mandates in light of perceived 
compliance with Human Rights Council resolution 5/2 (Code of Conduct). This gives credence 
to claims that politicisation, perhaps inevitably, is characterising the tenure of rapporteurs, 
especially those with country mandates. At present, thematic mandates are approved for three 
year periods, country mandates for one.lv Both can be renewed. Individual rapporteurs are now 
restricted to six year maximum terms.lvi However, there is no provision to preclude mandate 
holders from ‘swapping’ mandates and indeed there are some special rapporteurs who have held 
successive mandates. This obviously means the individuals concerned have amassed 
considerable expertise of UN procedures but raises potential problems as mandates can become 
‘closed shops’ with more experienced individuals likely to be reappointed. However, this does 
not alter the tenure requirements. Note that obviously there is also a provision for non-
accumulation of human rights functionslvii thus one UN position at a time is generally adhered to 
with minimal, if any, overlaps.
As for use of the Code of Conduct as a disciplinary tool against rapporteurs, applying strict 
interpretations of the Code (rather than using it as a general frameworklviii), it is stated that 
mandate-holders should ‘exercise their functions in accordance with their mandate and in 
compliance with the Regulations,lix as well as with the present code’.lx  This is a worrying 
development as resolutions passed in the Council may not have the general support of all States 
or even all regional groupings. Of greater concern, earlier drafts of the Code included 
suggestions on establishing an ‘Ethics Committee’ to oversee compliance by rapporteurs with the 
Code.lxi This despite the pre-existence of an internal peer-regulation procedure by which the 
Coordination Committee of the special rapporteurs itself addresses any issues.lxii
It is imperative that rapporteurs do not appear beholden to the Human Rights Council for their 
mandate to satisfy subjective tests of independence.
Approval and consideration of mandates
Mandates have grown in an ad hoc fashion over the last thirty years. The attempts of the Human 
Rights Council to streamline them and create a framework for their operation is potentially 
positive but has been viewed as a partial restriction on the freedom of the rapporteurs and even 
perceived as a threat to their independence.
The Human Rights Council considers the renewal of mandates themselves. Hurst Hannum 
suggests a radical approach: that ‘as a general rule’ most mandates should be terminated after a 
period of six years.lxiii He adds a caveat that this approach should not extend to protection 
mandates, rather be restricted to promotion mandates. The idea of finite mandates could certainly 
negate the threat of non-renewal as a quasi-sanction. It could also enrich the duration of the 
mandate through adding perspective, but with mandates remaining part-time unpaid positions, 
this is not necessarily a positive development. Arguably, an automatic ‘sunset’ clause could 
obviate some politicization concerns, thereby strengthening perceptions of independence of the 
rapporteurs vis-a-vis tenure. Hannum does accept that mandates should be retained or created if 
they ‘reflect the specific mandate and expertise of the Council; fill obvious gaps in human rights 
protection, seek to protect victims; and do not duplicate other work either within the framework 
of the Council or elsewhere in the UN system.’.lxiv Although the mandate for the Palestinian 
Territories occupied since 1967 is arguably the longest running mandate,lxv it could satisfy 
Hannum’s proposed test for continuation.
There is some evidence that mandates are being used as political tools – thus Lempinen and 
Scheinin report that ‘the price of maintaining the system of country-specific special procedures’ 
was the termination of the mandates for Cuba and Belarus.lxvi They also note that the 
geographical distribution of seats in the Council will make the creation of new country mandates 
more difficult than before.lxvii Indeed, Sudan is the only country mandate created by the 
Council.lxviii Perceived potential overlap between country mandates and universal periodic review 
(UPR) compound the issue. However, strong arguments can still be made that the procedures are 
inherently different: UPR is essentially peer review by States of States and considers the full 
spectrum of international human rights and humanitarian law; in contrast the country 
mechanisms are generally tasked with monitoring the situation and promoting human rights 
through dialogue, advice, advocacy and encouragement.lxix The two are rarely, if ever, 
incompatible. Indeed the reports of the special rapporteurs feed in to the work of the Council in 
UPR– part 2 (or b) of the documentation reflects this.lxx Given that only 68 States currently 
extend standing invitations to the special rapporteurs, Gutterlxxi and indeed others argue that 
States should  be ineligible to sit on the Human Rights Council if they demonstrate non-
compliance with special rapporteurs by, for example, refusing to issue an invitation, or imposing 
unacceptable restrictions on a visit. While this has some merit for thematic mandates, it is a more 
problematic stance with country mandates albeit that such countries are probably unlikely to seek 
membership of the Human Rights Council.
While the establishment, continuation and termination of mandates may exhibit political 
influences, it is submitted that those need not taint the question of independent of individual 
rapporteurs.
Exercise of mandates – scope and resources
Mandates are to examine, monitor, advise and report on specific countries and /or human 
rights.lxxii Rapporteurs are thus a conduit for, as well as generators of, information on human 
rights as standards in themselves or as applied in specific countries. The information generated is 
usually public (with the exception of the confidential complaint systems) and widely available. 
The rapporteurs operate under a unique set of mandates and operational requirements. Working 
under the umbrella of the UN and perceived independence, they enjoy access to all levels of 
society (in theory). They are also obligated to consider all sources of information. This is a key 
element distinguishing rapporteurs from other systems of human rights monitoring.
One of the most significant problems with most special procedures is their open-ended mandate, 
in the sense that they are often asked to undertaken additional work or indeed, they see the 
possibilities for additional work to develop their mandate and advance human rights. While there 
is obvious logic to maximising available resources, as discussed supra rapporteurs work pro-
bono and most have other employment. The ‘cost’ of independence is often a limitation of time 
for missions.
Some form of secured funding is essential for independence.  Work pro bono reinforces the fact 
that rapporteurs are independent, not UN employees. However, as human rights provisions on 
the judiciary etc make clear, threats to independence arise when mechanisms are dependent on 
executive bodies for funding. In accordance with the existing practices (and as per the Manual), 
visits are organized, funded and coordinated through the OHCHR. There have been examples of 
mandate holders undertaking more extensive visits with the support of external (to the UN) 
funding. This raises additional issues of independence as well as of parity of mandates (not all 
holders will have access to additional funding, or indeed feel it is appropriate to use such funds).
Should available money be distributed equally, does that reflect the ‘needs’ and relative 
importance of the mandates? By definition country mandates are now more urgent in the sense 
that they reflect the concern of the Human Rights Council for a particular country/ territory and 
appointments are subject to annual review before any renewal. Given the aspiration that the 
situation changes within twelve months and the mandate can be terminated, how many country 
visits should there be each term, does it depend on the cost, and how are countries ‘prioritised’ 
for visits? At present, thematic rapporteurs have considerable autonomy to prioritise their own 
programme of work within the terms of their mandates and in light of standing invitations and /or 
invitations sought and received from States. ‘Just because of the scarcity of resources and the 
limited working capacity of an individual, thematic rapporteurs cannot travel every year to any 
country that would deserve to be scrutinized’.lxxiii Many rapporteurs do focus on visits to States 
which have not yet issued standing invitations and States which have not yet ratified relevant (to 
thematic mandate) core treaties.lxxiv (Obviously the rapporteurs uphold general international 
human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratification or 
accession to any given treaty is not a pre-requisite to a thematic visit or to consideration of any 
right or freedom by country mandate holders).
Finally, it is important to re-emphasise that rapporteurs have immunity from legal process whilst 
under mandate.lxxv In carrying out their functions, they are bound by both the Code of Conductlxxvi 
and the Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of Official other than 
Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission,lxxvii giving rise to potential confusion as the two 
documents are not entirely congruent.
Alternatives to the present system
The Human Rights Council uses the work of rapporteurs, both as part of Universal Periodic 
Review and as a contribution to its Special Sessions. The work of rapporteurs is also increasingly 
cited within Council debates, by NGOs and civil society, States, and treaty monitoring bodies. 
As their work is clearly valued, any discussion on the possibilities of independence must also 
consider alternatives: if special rapporteurs continue outwith the Human Rights Council, where 
could they sit? 
The General Assembly is an obvious possibility. This would presumably mean under the 
‘jurisdiction’ of the ‘Third Committee’ on social, humanitarian and cultural affairs which already 
interacts with special rapporteurs. At present, the Human Rights Council still reports to the 
General Assembly so such a move is superfluous. Moreover, there is no guarantee that 
independence would be achieved. Politicised statements and challenges inevitably characterise 
the work of the General Assembly, albeit with a more diluted effect than is perhaps apparent in 
the Human Rights Council. Indeed there is already some evidence of States objecting to aspects 
of mandates and raising issues direct in the General Assembly, obviating the Council entirely, 
the General Assembly having a global membership and different alliances than those 
characterising the Council. Furthermore, the General Assembly already can convene sessions to 
consider human rights related issues and can appoint its own experts to undertake any 
investigations. Moving wholly to the auspices of the General Assembly would be a retrograde 
step.
The Security Council can invoke the UN Charter’s enforcement provisions as well as 
investigating many issues. (It can and has appointed various fact finding missions.) Accordingly, 
positioning the mandates under the Security Council would remove some aspects of 
independence – for example appointments and mandates would always be scrutinised the five 
permanent members. In light of the omnipresent possibility of veto, the Security Council can be 
more political than the Human Rights Council or General Assembly, its comparative inactivity 
during the Cold War aptly demonstrates the paralysis which can occur when there are deep 
political divisions among the five permanent members. Furthermore, were rapporteurs directly 
responsible to the Security Council, they may be viewed as essentially more politicised than at 
present with the (albeit perhaps not entirely likely) possibility of enforcement action ensuing 
from any negative report.
The Secretary-General him (or in the future possibly her) self is another option.  As with the 
other bodies discussed above, the Secretary-General has appointed various independent experts 
over the years. Given the wealth of other tasks falling on the Secretary-General and the nature of 
the role, as per the UN Charter, it is possibly not the best destination for any system of 
mechanisms of human rights. Perhaps some fact-finding elements and doctrinal analysis could 
fall within the remit of the office, but it would certainly be a change in function, something not 
likely to attract widespread support. Moreover, the personal characteristics and goals of each 
Secretary-General can vary. Ban Ki-Moon, it is written, views human rights as an integral part of 
the ‘UN triad of security, human rights and development’ thus would support rapporteurs.lxxviii 
The priorities of future Secretary-Generals may vary. Ultimately the Secretary-General heads the 
secretariat and employers, with a primary function clearly administrative in character. 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is perhaps the most obvious 
alternative. Certainly the power and credibility of the officelxxix has grown dramatically since its 
merger in 1997 with the former Centre for Human Rights in Geneva, and it is now a well-
recognised authority on the global system of human rights. Although the High Commissioner has 
considerable diplomatic power and provides varied forms of assistance to governments as well as 
providing secretarial support to the treaty monitoring bodies, it arguably remains chronically 
underfunded. Despite this the OHCHR provides invaluable support to rapporteurs before and 
during country visits as well as generally administrative support for those wishing it. This 
arguably does not compromise the neutrality of the rapporteurs, given the impartiality expected 
of the OHCHR. Transparency of selection, appointment and termination would perhaps appear 
more independent were responsibility to transfer to the OHCHR but, as noted above,lxxx this was 
unsuccessfully mooted.
Treaty bodies operating to monitor compliance of States with their treaty obligations. This is 
also a non-starter as the whole point of rapporteurs is that they are not restricted to measuring 
compliance with a single treaty. Nigel Rodley, who has held appointments as both a rapporteur 
and a member of a treaty monitoring body, makes clear his view that coexistence is mutually 
beneficial.lxxxi Thus while treaty bodies use rapporteurs and may work closely with them, there is 
no potential for them to administer the system.
The Economic and Social Council retains responsibility for human rights, although should the 
Human Rights Council achieve full status as a Council, responsibility will shift. Ramcharan 
notes that ‘[i]t must be admitted that the Economic and Social Council has not really played a 
substantive role on human rights issues for quite some time’.lxxxii Nevertheless, it maintains a 
rolelxxxiii and previously, of course, rapporteurs operated under the auspices of ECOSOC’s 
Commission on Human Rights.
Others options would remove the rapporteurs from the UN system: States and National Human 
Rights Institutions should have that power already to investigate as do NGOs and civil society 
organisations.  While undoubtedly particularly the latter entities play a role in fact-finding and 
reporting, a role recognised in the stakeholders report for UPR, they lack the credibility and 
impartiality which attachment to the UN system provides.
Naturally the system of special rapporteurs cannot exist in a vacuum, thus consideration must be 
given to their formal role and situation within the United Nations. It is perhaps helpful to 
consider the implications of moving the rapporteurs from the jurisdiction of the Human Rights 
Council.
What are the implications for the Human Rights Council if special rapporteurs are removed  
from their jurisdiction?
Should the special procedures move from the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Council, it is 
submitted that the Human Rights Council would immediately lose some of its credibility. If there 
is no semblance of independence therewith, that authority is inevitably undermined. Confidence 
in the Human Rights Council as a body would be eroded, lessening its chances of recognition as 
a full council of the UN. Moreover, without the rapporteurs to exercise a check and balance 
effect on information, substance would be added to claims of politicisation, similar claims 
arguably sealing the fate of the Commission on Human Rights. The Human Rights Council 
would also lose a very valuable pool of expertise to draw on, although it obviously retains its 
Advisory Committee.
A final point to consider, removing the Special Rapporteurs from the Human Rights Council 
would arguably undermine the Council’s role of according human rights ‘a more authoritative 
position’lxxxiv  and place the Council in breach of GA Res 60/251. 
Conclusions
Independence is a multi-faceted concept, entailing subjective and objective tests. Key 
instruments provide a system of guarantees for de facto independence of rapporteurs in their 
functions. Nevertheless concerns remain as to whether all rapporteurs are independent, concerns 
which perhaps are better phrased as whether rapporteurs can ever be totally independent, given it 
is so complicated to establish from whom they should be independent and how that 
independence can be proven. Undoubtedly special rapporteurs are securely woven into the fabric 
of human rights protection and promotion activities undertaken under the auspices of the United 
Nations. That importance is, in no small way, attributable to their perceived independence which 
enables them to work across all sectors of society in their efforts to advance the promotion and 
protection of human rights. Strengthening of the position of special procedures has occurred intra 
se as rapporteurs become increasingly ‘expert’.lxxxv That expertise, however, arguably comes at a 
cost for independence. Accruing appropriate qualifications and experience frequently involves 
interaction with key actors thereby raising potential challenges on subjective independence. 
Rapporteurs’ work is further strengthened through growing evidence of joint visits, 
communiqués and press releases.lxxxvi Cooperation between rapporteurs minimises overlapping in 
their activities (important when there are limited resources) and increases the pressure which can 
be applied on States which are failing to meet their obligations under international human rights. 
It also ameliorates the independence issue by ‘defraying’ the impact of any single rapporteur.
Thus, does it still matter whether special rapporteurs are independent by any or all tests? 
Independence is not necessarily determinative of competency. Credibility is, however, decisive, 
independence being a major component thereof.  Arguably it is for country rather than thematic 
mandates that independence is more indicative of credibility but, even then, the alleged 
politicisation of Human Rights Council decisions to create or maintain country mandates seems 
to attain a higher profile than the individual appointment of a rapporteur.
Rapporteurs continue to do a remarkable job under difficult circumstances, their success 
attributable to the individual personalities of the mandate-holders. The aura of credibility and 
respect they enjoy takes hard work and dedication. While standardising and streamlining the 
process of selection and termination of mandates is perhaps inevitable, it potentially comes at a 
price: eroding the independence of the rapporteurs through increasing their accountability to the 
Human Rights Council removes a part of the very essence which sets them apart from other 
mechanisms in the first place. The autonomy of the rapporteurs, albeit dependent on the 
professionalism and passion for human rights of the mandate holders, is key to their neutrality, 
objectivity, respect and integrity. Special rapporteurs occupy a unique place in the mesh of 
mechanisms which promote and protect the web of international human rights, the ‘crown jewel’ 
of the system as Kofi Annan famously described them.lxxxvii Multifaceted though that jewel 
undoubtedly is, clouding rapporteurs’ independence and autonomy will inevitably tarnish and 
reduce value. Careful consideration of the consequences of any proposed changes is vital during 
the forthcoming review.
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